Testing a theory on the legislative architecture of the Internet

Complex is undoubtedly the adjective that best summarises the issue of the normative architecture of the Internet network. This issue is complex for two reasons. The first one results from the identification of the rules that make up this architecture and the second one from their purpose. First of all, the identification of the rules proves to be an extremely complex matter, since this concept of the rule is not so easy to define, as it refers to such a wide range of realities. After establishing the existence of the rules which set the behaviour of network builders, it is necessary to raise the question of the the nature of the rules. Here again, solving this issue is not as easy as it seems. In fact, in literature there is no universal way to distinguish the various types of rules. Secondly, the rules that compose the normative architecture of the internet aim at organising the digital society. Yet, this is a complex system. If one accepts the idea, one has to correlatively claim that the rule-complying scheme that enables such a system to be controlled is very different from that which rules more common rules for us, such as the rules of law. While the former is underpinned by a self organising mechanism, the creation of the latter stems from an act of willing. The difference between both schemes is significant: in the first case spontaneity controls the setting up of rules of conduct, while in the second case reason does. The opposition between these two normative schemes can be found in the digital universe too. It is conveyed by the existing competition between the digital and the legal orders. That is why the normative architecture of the Internet network will be described through the competition between these two normative systems.