Civil liability on financial markets

The aim of our research is to determine whether the specificity of financial markets require to adapt tort law. Our study is limited to multilateral trade markets and specific faults-defective public information and market abuses-. In effect, it is in this context that the problem is most acute as these faults affect the market itself and can injure all investors. The mutilateral aspect of financial markets then stands in sharp contrast with the individual dimension of civil liability. There, the damage is fragmented, uncertain and difficult to assess, and liability is subject to a dilemma: should you compensate for the alteration of the decision or of the market? To answer the question, we used comparative law.
De lege lata, in all States defective public information arouses most interest: various solutions have been adopted to compensate either an alteration of the decision or of the market price, by the judge (USA, France) or by Parliament Germany, UK). De lege feranda, we opt for compensating only investors who relied on the information for both defective public information or fraudulent market intervention (price manipulation and insider trading). This restrictive approach does not require any adaptation of tort law, so the common law should continue to apply. The specificity of financial markets is finally too strong for civil liability to play a real role there. We must accept that it plays only a residual part on the market and instead rely on criminal and administrative enforcement to deter and prevent the occurence of damage to investors.