A microeconomic analysis of rules of proof in civil litigation

Procedural rules are likely to affect the strategies of the parties in a dispute. We study their impact on the volume of litigation and on the amount of legal expenses incurred by parties to win the trial. These two components of the social cost of litigation are at the heart of the challenges that must be addressed by developed countries to guarantee the effective enforcement of the substantive law. Our works relate more specifically to rules of proof, and the emphasis is given on the opposition between civilian and common law rules.  
After defining the scope and the stakes of the thesis in the general introduction, we develop a plan in two parts. Part I studies parties' behavior when they have the possibility to negotiate to avoid a trial. Strategic and divergent expectations models are developed to apprehend parties'
decisions to sue and to settle. The second Part is oriented toward the evidence production process preceding the final hearing. We use rent-seeking models to analyze parties' incentives to engage legal expenditures.  
The results suggest that rules of proof have a substantial effect on the social cost of litigation. We show that the volume of litigation in the US and in France can be explained by the various rules of proof prevailing in these two countries. Moreover, our analysis reveals that the rules of proof constitute a major determinant of the private cost of litigation and of defendant's defense strategies.