The distinction of relative and absolute nullities

The scholarly distinction of relative and absolute nullities appeared in our law during the sixteenth century. Ever since, scholarly opinion has been that the entire regime of a cause of nullity depends on the implementation of this distinction. The operational nature of this distinction is regularly questioned, and even discussed. Yet, its probable establishment by the upcoming reform of the law of obligations urges a scrutiny of this distinction's relevance. In order to fulfil its task of knowledge of the law, the distinction of relative and absolute nullities must, like every binary distinction, possess three characteristics: firstly, a solid criterion of distinction must enable it to be operational; secondly, the two parts of the distinction must correspond to two sets of significantly different rules, this difference being the heart of the distinction; and thirdly, a difference in the nature of the two parts of the distinction, established by the chosen criterion, and justifying the difference of regimes.

However, after close analysis, the distinction of relative and absolute nullities possesses neither a reliable criterion of distinction, nor an uncontested difference in the regimes, nor a duality of nature.

The study of the nullity's nature will enable us to state that nullity has a uniform nature: nullity will be analysed as a sanction of the act's legality that must be imposed. More often than not, it will be imposed by the judge and will have a judicial nature.

Thus, the uniform nature of judicial sanction of the act's legality must correspond to a single regime, in other words it must correspond to rules that are common to all causes of nullity. Since the nature conditions the regime, the latter must be established by taking into consideration the nature of the proposed nullity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to also take into consideration the legal provisions specific to certain causes of nullity