Le Lemma organise un séminaire, sur le thème « Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations » le jeudi 30 mars 2023 à 14h. 

Alessandro ISPANO (Université de Cergy)

Résumé : 

A decision-maker who aims to find out the truth from a suspect delegates to an interrogator with possibly different preferences. The ideal interrogator is always biased, sometimes nicer and sometimes tougher. The decision-maker can further improve by delegating to a nicer interrogator when the evidence is weak and to a tougher interrogator when the evidence is strong. Provided the decision-maker does not learn the details of the interrogation, she may then equivalently retain authority over decisions. Sequential delegation with leniency for perjury can implement the optimal mechanism with full commitment.

Plus d'informations (432.46 ko)